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Modelling the effects of childcare policy 
changes 
The Childcare and Early Childhood Learning inquiry terms of reference require the 
Commission to assess the contribution that access to affordable, quality childcare can make 
to child development and increased participation in the workforce. The Commission has 
been requested to consider new policy options within the current government funding 
parameters. 
In addressing its task, the Commission has developed a model to gauge the potential 
impacts of policy scenarios proposed in the draft report (referred to as the Productivity 
Commission Microsimulation Childcare (PCMC) model). This technical supplement 
presents the interim version of this model and preliminary results used for the draft inquiry 
report. It also outlines some caveats and limitations to bear in mind when interpreting the 
results. 
The main results show that the proposed simplification of the existing childcare 
arrangements could increase demand for childcare and labour supply from parents. Further, 
the changes are likely to benefit low- and middle-income households and increase 
workforce participation in these groups.  
This paper is divided into 5 sections: 
1. The first provides a broad overview of the Commission’s approach to the modelling 
task and the framework adopted. 
2. The second highlights the assumptions, caveats and limitations that are important when 
considering the results and implications of the Commission’s preliminary modelling. 
3. The third details the policy changes being examined. 
4. The fourth explains the illustrative, initial results, as well as the intuition behind them. 
5. The fifth section concludes by identifying areas of planned further development. 
The paper also includes appendixes — on model data sources and preparation; a detailed 
model specification; detailing listing of the parameters used in the modelling; and results 
for all four policy options described in the draft inquiry report. 
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1 Commission’s approach 
The Commission has developed an initial, behavioural microsimulation model to estimate 
the effects of several policy scenarios. 
Behavioural microsimulation models — models that simulate individual-level decisions 
and sometimes the interaction of individual decision makers — are commonly used within 
an economic framework to assess the impact of government policy changes, such as 
changes in tax and benefits, on governments’ fiscal position and on labour supply.1 They 
are particularly useful where there is a wide variety in decision makers and complex policy 
changes are likely to impact these different decision makers in different ways. 
Microsimulation models can incorporate information from large data sets that reflect the 
heterogeneity found in the population and generate disaggregated results to facilitate a 
detailed analysis of how a policy might affect particular groups (Creedy, Duncan, Kalb and 
Scutella 2004). 
The simplest microsimulation models are used to calculate, for example, changes in tax 
bills and net incomes that arise from changing eligibility for a benefit, assuming no 
behavioural responses of those affected by the policy. These types of models, so-called 
static microsimulation models, are designed to capture ‘morning after’ effects. More 
sophisticated models contain an additional behavioural component, designed to model the 
effects of policy changes on the decisions of households. 
Several researchers have used behavioural microsimulation models to estimate the effects 
on labour markets from changes in Australian childcare policy. The Commission’s model 
draws on features of models developed by Doiron and Kalb (2005) and Gong and Breunig 
(2012). 
  
                                                 
1 Note that this labour supply change is referring to the change in labour supply from households, not the 
induced change in the ECEC workforce that could be brought about due to changes in the childcare 
market. 
   
 MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF CHILDCARE POLICY CHANGESMODELLING THE EFFECTS OF 
CHILDCARE POLICY CHANGES - TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT TO DRAFT REPORT - CHILDCARE AND 
EARLY CHILDHOOD LEARNING 
3 
  
 
Box 1 The childcare policy microsimulation models used 
In developing its model, the Commission has drawn on two existing microsimulation models that 
have been used previously to estimate the effects of childcare policy on household behaviour in 
Australia. 
Doiron and Kalb (2005) 
The model developed by Doiron and Kalb builds on the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer 
Simulator (MITTS) model. The latter was designed to model household behavioural responses 
and to estimate the effects of a policy change on labour supply. To adapt that model to a 
childcare policy context, Doiron and Kalb added a childcare module. The childcare module 
consists of equations that determine demands for childcare by sole parent and coupled 
households for each work choice, based on household characteristics.  
The Doiron and Kalb model estimates a household’s labour supply on the basis of the 
household’s income net of childcare costs. The demand for formal childcare is derived from the 
household’s labour supply. Expenditure on formal childcare is used as an input into the 
household’s budget constraint, which itself is an input into the decision to supply labour.  
Gong and Breunig (2012) 
In the Gong and Breunig model, a household’s demand for formal childcare is modelled 
explicitly, jointly with the primary carer’s decision to supply labour. A household is assumed to 
make the decisions simultaneously to maximise utility. The demand for childcare enters directly 
into the household’s utility function and the model allows formal childcare to be valued for 
reasons other than freeing up time for mothers to work, such as child development.  
The Commission’s framework is largely based on the Gong and Breunig model. 
 
 
Model specification 
The model is comprised of three modules: 
• the tax and transfer module, which calculates disposable income based on market 
income, tax and benefits; the module reproduces the main features of the income tax 
schedule as well as the benefit system 
• the childcare module, which calculates income net of out-of-pocket fees; reproduces 
the features of the childcare rebate (CCR) and childcare benefit (CCB)2; this module is 
adapted when modelling alternative childcare policies 
• the decision module, which models households’ reactions to changes in the incentives 
before them. 
The first two modules constitute the ‘morning after’ component of the model and account 
for policies as at July 2014, while the third functions as its behavioural element. 
                                                 
2 In the draft report version of the model, the childcare module only includes CCR and CCB, and does not 
include other payments (such as JETCCFA). These will be included for the final report. 
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Tax and transfer module 
The basic tax and transfer module calculates net income given the rules of the Australian 
tax and transfer system, based on gross income and household characteristics. The income 
tax schedule, all aspects of income support for working age families (including, for 
example, Newstart allowance, the Parenting Payment and the Disability Support Pension) 
and Family Tax Benefit A and B3 are accounted for in this module. This module serves as 
an input into the household decision module. 
Childcare module 
The module includes the rules that govern the existing CCB and the CCR, including the 
current income and activity tests for CCB and the annual per child cap on CCR. It also 
enables alternative income and activity tests for the proposed new single child-based 
payment, the Early Care and Learning Subsidy (ECLS). Income net of out-of-pocket costs 
to families is calculated based on family labour income and transfers, net of income taxes, 
for given household characteristics.4 This module also serves as an input into the 
household decision module. 
Decision module 
The model represents household decisions about work and childcare in response to a 
change in out-of-pocket fees for sole parent and coupled households where the youngest 
child is aged between 0 and 12 years. The main results consist of a projected choice, for 
each household of:  
• the number of hours of work supplied by the primary care giver (including whether to 
enter or leave the workforce) 
• the number of hours of formal childcare demanded.  
The decisions are modelled simultaneously, consistent with the methodology developed in 
Gong and Breunig (2012). The manner in which these decisions are made, and the 
constraints facing households, are described in appendix B. 
The results at the household level are aggregated to obtain estimates of shifts in labour 
supply and demand for formal childcare at an aggregate level, or for particular 
demographic groups. Combined with a demand for labour and a supply for childcare 
services, the results can be used to estimate fiscal costs. 
The decision module is specified to generate a decision that maximises each household’s 
utility. A household’s utility is assumed to be quadratic and driven by the following 
                                                 
3 Using pre-2014 Budget parameter values. 
4 The model abstracts from changes in income from sources other than hours worked (e.g. capital income is 
assumed not to change as a result of childcare policies). 
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variables, which are explicitly included in the utility function. The exact terms in the 
household utility functions are detailed in appendix B. 
Income net of taxes, transfers and out-of-pocket childcare fees 
Households derive utility from income, as it can be spent on goods and services. The 
model uses the labour income of the household net of taxes and transfers and out-of-pocket 
childcare fees as the input into the utility function. For tractability, the model only 
estimates the impact of a change in the net income of the primary carer; the hours worked 
and wage rate of the primary earner are assumed to be exogenous. (Although the primary 
earner could reduce their hours worked as their partner increases them, preliminary 
simulations not detailed in this document (where the hours of the primary earner were 
allowed to vary) indicated that this effect is small.) 
Hours of labour supplied 
Households derive utility from reducing the hours worked by the primary carer, because 
that time can be used in other ways, including for leisure, caring for children, or other 
home production. Households are assumed to derive utility from working zero hours. The 
model includes a fixed cost associated with work5, such as travel and other costs (aside 
from childcare costs) associated with working. 
Leisure and home production are not explicitly represented in the household utility 
function. However, households derive utility from income but disutility from hours spent at 
work, and utility from time spent caring for children directly. Given that each member of 
the household is subject to a 24 hours a day time constraint, leisure and home production 
are valued implicitly. 
Childcare from the primary care giver 
Households derive utility from caring for children at home. The amount of childcare 
provided by the primary carer appears directly in the household’s utility function.  
Formal childcare 
The amount of formal childcare demanded by a household appears directly in the utility 
function (representing, for example, the household’s valuation of educational or social 
development of childcare). This means that use of formal childcare can provide households 
with benefits beyond those from enabling the primary carer to work. For this reason, 
formal childcare and the income that it enables households to earn appear separately in the 
utility function. 
                                                 
5  This is represented by the intercept utility parameter associated with zero work.  
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Behaviour of households with multiple children 
Households with multiple children are assumed to base labour supply and childcare hours 
demand decisions on the caring needs of the youngest child. That is, childcare for school 
age children mirrors the decision for the youngest child. For example, for a family with 
one pre-school and one school-age child, if the younger child requires 40 hours per week 
of non-parental childcare, the older child would also require 40 hours of non-parental 
supervision/care (consisting of a combination of school and outside of school hours care).  
Substitution between formal and informal childcare 
Informal childcare is specified as the residual care required, net of the household’s demand 
for formal childcare and of the time spent with the primary carer. Informal care can come 
from a range of sources not explicitly represented in the model, including the primary 
earner, other family members, neighbours and friends. The costs associated with informal 
care are not observed, but must be accounted for. If no utility parameters governed the 
relative value placed on the different forms of care, households would source all 
non-maternal care from informal care (since it is assumed to be free). Constraints on 
maternal time and required total childcare, combined with utility parameters for maternal 
and formal childcare, ensure the model reproduces the observed data. Observed data show 
that as people work more, their demand for formal care increases.  
Figure 1 provides a stylised representation of the model at the household level. It breaks 
down the model into the ‘morning after’ components (the impacts on household budgets 
from changes in taxes, transfers and childcare payments if the household did not change its 
behaviour) and the ‘behavioural’ components (the impacts on the household decisions 
resulting from the changes in policy). 
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Figure 1 Stylised Productivity Commission Microsimulation Childcare 
Model  
 
  
 
The framework adopted by the Commission 
Rather than specify labour supply and childcare demand as a continuous range, where 
primary carers could adjust those decisions in infinitely small increments, care and work 
choices in the Commission’s model are divided into blocks reflecting observed values (for 
example, an individual is assumed to choose to work 8 or 16 hours, not 10.71 hours). 
Under this approach, primary carers can make a choice from a limited set of combinations 
of labour and childcare hours.  
This approach has practical, computational advantages, does not compromise materially 
the accuracy of results, and offers a tractable way to model policies and outcomes that 
involve ‘discontinuities’ or non-linear relationships that would be challenging to specify 
and estimate in a model with continuous variables (Creedy and Kalb 2006). In the case of 
childcare policy and workforce participation, the tax and transfer system (as well as the 
CCB and CCR rules), are characterised by complex sliding scales and eligibility thresholds 
(see appendixes C and G in the inquiry draft report).  
Furthermore, the characteristics of the labour and childcare markets mean that there is 
typically a limited number of part-time work and formal childcare combinations that the 
primary carer would be able to secure. 
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Labour supply and childcare demand options available to primary carers 
Households are assumed to choose a level of primary carers’ weekly supply of labour 
within the range of 0–56 hours, in 8-hour increments. That is, they can choose from eight 
options, including 0 hours. They can also choose one of six 10-hour increment options of 
formal childcare demanded in the range of 0–50 hours, including 0 hours.6 Thus, 
households can elect from 48 combinations of hours of labour supplied and formal 
childcare demanded. Variations on the increments of formal childcare demanded will also 
be considered in order to better reflect common use patterns for more flexible home based 
care options. 
Households can choose between long day care, family day care, out of school hours care, 
nannies and pre-school (where they do not already use pre-school for a 4 year old child). 
Under the base case of current childcare assistance arrangements, the choice of childcare 
type is determined by a household’s initial choice as described in the database; for new 
users, 98 per cent of households are randomly assigned to a care type based on observed 
shares of the data (by income group), and 2 per cent are assumed to use nannies (nanny use 
would increase with the new arrangements in the model, since subsidies are introduced for 
nannies where previously they did not exist; however, the extent to which households 
entering the childcare market would start choosing to use nannies is unclear. The 2 per cent 
figure was chosen in the absence of any information about household response; it is larger 
than the proportion of nanny use observed in the Survey of Income and Housing). 
The full technical specification of the model is detailed in appendix B.  
Data set and estimation 
In addition to the administrative rules governing the CCB, CCR and the broader tax and 
transfer system, the model integrates two data sets to establish the baseline, and obtain 
weights for subsequent aggregation of results: 
• data from the ABS Survey of Income and Housing 2011-12 (SIH)  
• administrative data about childcare fees by type of care used and location for 2011-12 
which has been supplied by the Department of Education.  
The SIH includes data for around 3500 households representative of sole and couple parent 
households in Australia. The data for each observation were combined with administrative 
childcare fee data for 1.29 million children, based on location. The procedures used to 
produce the model database are summarised in appendix A. 
                                                 
6 Outside of school hours care is divided into 4-hour increments (up to a total of 20 hours per week), which 
is used in conjunction with 6 hours of school per day. 
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Box 2 Data sources 
The microsimulation model uses two data sources: 
• The 2011 12 Survey of Income and Housing (ABS 2013) contains key demographic and 
economic characteristics of residents in private dwellings across Australia. The model 
database focuses on a subsample of the survey describing lone and coupled parents. All 
variables except childcare price are derived from this subsample. 
• An administrative childcare database (Department of Education 2013, unpublished), which 
provides a comprehensive description of childcare use, price, location of service and 
subsidies (CCR and CCB). The administrative database was used to provide the mean and 
standard deviation of childcare prices by geographic location and type of care. 
Several observations were excluded from the model database. Specifically, observations that 
reported zero employee income and positive labour supply, or positive employee income and 
zero labour supply, were removed. Similarly, observations that reported parents with no children 
were also removed. 
The final model database contains 2955 households (comprising 684 lone parent and 2271 
coupled parent families). The database contains variables describing income, labour supply, 
number of children, age of parents, occupation, industry of employment, location, educational 
attainment, transfer payments received, hours of childcare used and childcare prices faced for 
each household. 
There is a plan to further develop the model database by obtaining a better concordance 
between the individuals in the survey data and the observed hours of childcare use, the 
distribution of subsidies and of childcare prices in the administrative data. 
 
 
In the draft report version of the model, the utility and wage parameters have not been 
estimated using the above data sets. Instead, the parameters used in the model are based on 
those from the Doiron and Kalb (2005) model, adjusted to reflect differences in the utility 
function for the current model and calibrates the specification of the utility function with 
the data using ‘unobserved utility parameters’, consistent with the approach documented in 
Creedy and Kalb (2005). Reflecting uncertainty in model parameters, the Commission has 
undertaken sensitivity analysis to put ranges around model results. 
2 Assumptions, caveats and limitations 
There are important caveats that need to be remembered when evaluating the results from 
the model. The first two make the results particularly preliminary and exploratory: 
1. Parameters: for the draft report version of the model, utility parameters are sourced 
from past studies, mainly Doiron and Kalb (2005), which estimate parameters from 
1996-97 data. The 2011-12 data may reveal different preferences than those reflected in 
the parameters derived from earlier data.7  
                                                 
7  This will be addressed in a future version of the model by estimating the utility function based on the 
more recent data.  
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2. Data: responses in the SIH might not be internally consistent, or questions could be 
misunderstood or answered incorrectly by participants. The SIH is yet to be 
systematically reconciled with other sources. For example, some households have 
inconsistent responses in the survey, such as zero hours worked with non-zero labour 
income (see appendix A). Further data work is required to ensure the survey is 
representative of the population. 
3. Unemployment benefits: The model as currently implemented assumes that people who 
do not work and meet the eligibility requirements claim NewStart benefits. In the data, 
there are a number of seemingly eligible people who do not claim unemployment 
benefits. 
4. Childcare demand: the childcare hour result is best interpreted as a shift in the demand 
for childcare. The model assumes that each individual can obtain as many hours of 
childcare as they want at the price they currently pay. There is no representation of 
childcare supply: there is no increasing cost of childcare, nor any capacity constraints 
and quality is assumed fixed. To the extent that childcare availability is constrained at 
current prices, the labour supply response could be smaller than projected. If childcare 
prices were to increase, the returns to labour net of taxes and out of pocket costs would 
decrease and the labour supply response and childcare demand response would reduce 
accordingly.  
5. Labour supply: the labour hour results represent a shift in the supply of labour. The 
model assumes each individual can work as many hours as they want at the current 
wage. There is no representation of the demand for labour. Any employment result will 
be smaller than or equal to the projected labour supply shifts. To the extent that labour 
supply increases, the real wage might fall, which could cause a reduction in the 
quantity of labour supplied by other individuals in the economy. 
6. Tax impacts: There is no representation of the potential reductions in labour supply if 
taxes have to be increased to fund any increases in fiscal cost. To the extent that 
additional funding is required through additional taxes, labour supply responses among 
those modelled could be lower than in the model results, and could be negative from 
individuals not included in the model (those without children).  
7. Broader economic impacts: the projected shifts in labour supply and childcare demand 
can be interpreted as upper bounds on the estimated effects on employment and 
childcare use. Any GDP extrapolation based on these shifts is therefore best interpreted 
as an upper bound on the possible effects on GDP.8  
                                                 
8  Further, GDP is not a measure of social welfare. Important components of social welfare that are relevant 
to this policy are excluded from GDP. In particular, while formal childcare contributes to GDP as part of 
economic activity, informal and parental care (valued by households) are not accounted for, and nor is the 
value of home production or that of leisure, or the possible longer term benefits of improved child 
development associated with participation in some types of formal childcare. Some of the longer term 
benefits might appear as positive GDP effects in the long run, which is not reflected in the 
microsimulation model. 
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The Commission will try to improve the model for the final report by: 
• improving the model database to include a better mapping of households to the actual 
childcare prices they are likely to face 
• including a more detailed uprating procedure to improve the quality of the database and 
fiscal estimates 
• re-estimating the equation used to impute a wage for those not currently working 
• re-estimating the parameters of the utility function based on the SIH data 
• improving the model calibration process, consistent with the approach detailed in 
Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (1998) 
3 Policy simulations  
For each policy scenario, the model produces results that include: 
• net change in the supply of labour 
• net change in demand for formal childcare 
• fiscal costs making simplifying assumptions about labour demand and childcare supply. 
• a range of aggregations for the impacts on various cohorts for labour supply, childcare 
demand, out-of-pocket expenses, effective subsidy rates.9 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the data and parameter values, results are presented in 
terms of ranges. The sensitivity tests varied the utility parameters on income, formal 
childcare and labour supply by up to 50 per cent. 
The Commission has used the microsimulation model to examine four variants of early 
childhood subsidies (outlined in appendix D). These policies relate to the Early Childhood 
and Learning Subsidy (ECLS) proposed in the draft report. Other proposals have not been 
explicitly modelled. Each of these ECLS variants include: 
1. A tightening of the activity test for childcare assistance eligibility. At present, there is 
no activity test for households claiming 24 hours or less of childcare a week, and the 
CCR simply requires that each parent be working/training/studying/seeking 
work/volunteering to be eligible. There is an activity test (15 hours a week) that 
households must meet to receive a subsidy for childcare hours in excess of 24 hours per 
week. The scenarios institute a 24-hour fortnightly activity test on each parent in the 
household to be eligible for formal childcare assistance (not including pre-school).10 
                                                 
9 Conditional on assuming no changes in wages and no changes in childcare fees, and that childcare services 
and employment are available at any quantity at current prices. 
10 In the draft report, the activity test is applied for all families other than when grandparents are the primary 
carers of children, when parents receive a Disability Support Pension, Carer Payment, or when children 
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2. A simplified assistance scheme replacing CCB and CCR with a single payment (means 
tested against household income), calculated as a percentage of a deemed cost of 
childcare. 
The deemed costs are set per hour of childcare and are less than the actual childcare fees 
paid by approximately 50 per cent of the households in the population. Deemed costs vary 
by type of care (long day care, family day care including nannies and outside of school 
hours care). A household cannot receive a subsidy in excess of childcare fees. 
The policy scenarios proposed in the draft inquiry report vary the parameter values 
associated with the policy change (for example, the income thresholds at which the 
assistance rate begins to decline, and the rates at various income thresholds). The following 
will focus on the preferred scenario for expository purposes.11 In addition to the activity 
test mentioned above, this scenario (figure 2) includes:  
3. assistance at 90 per cent of deemed costs for households with income less than $60 000 
4. assistance at 30 per cent of deemed costs for households with income at or above 
$300 000 
5. Subsidy rates for households with an income between $60 000 and $300 000, are 
calculated using a linear taper rate. For example, a household with an income of 
$100 000 would receive 80 per cent of their deemed costs. 
                                                                                                                                                    
are assessed to be at risk. These exemptions to the activity test have not been included in the draft report 
modelling. 
11 The other scenarios examined by the Commission are discussed in chapter 13 of the inquiry report and in 
appendix D of the supplement. This paper focusses on the preferred scenario to highlight the drivers and 
mechanisms underpinning the results from the draft report version of the microsimulation model. The 
drivers and mechanisms are largely the same across policies (although the relative magnitudes differ). 
Results are presented for all scenarios in appendix D of the supplement. 
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Figure 2 Schedule of subsidy rates under ECLSa 
 
 
a ECLS replaces existing CCB and CCR arrangements with a single means tested subsidy rate applied to 
a deemed cost base. 
 
 
4 Model results, mechanisms and drivers 
Table 1 presents results ranges for the first scenario, as well as an example result within the 
range. The results are exploratory at the draft report stage of the model development 
because of the uncertainty about the values of the parameters used in the utility function 
(which determine individual responsiveness within the model) (see appendix B). The 
‘example’ results are based on a mid-range set of utility parameters taken from past studies 
(in particular Doiron and Kalb (2005) and Gong and Breunig (2012)). As mentioned 
above, the ranges were constructed by varying these parameters by up to 50 per cent. For 
the final report, sensitivity ranges and distributions for parameters will be constructed 
using information derived from the joint estimation of all utility function parameters. 
Unless stated otherwise, model results for labour supply are couched in terms of shifts in 
aggregate national labour supply.  
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Table 1 Illustrative labour supply, childcare demand and fiscal 
results 
 Lower bound 
results from all 
sensitivity 
simulationsa 
Results for 
central 
parameter 
valuesd 
Upper bound 
results from all 
sensitivity 
simulations 
Millions of hours per week    
Demand and supply shifts    
Labour supply base 53.1 53.1 53.1 
Labour supply policy 54.0 55.0 56.8 
Labour supply change 0.9 1.9 3.8 
Childcare demand base 
18.7 18.7 18.7 
Childcare demand policy 20.3 22.4 27.3 
Childcare demand change 1.7 3.8 8.6 
Billions of dollars per year (2013-14)    
Net change in government fiscal positionb -2.7 -0.8 0.8 
Change in childcare subsidy expense  0.2 1.3 3.3 
Change in transfer expense -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 
Change in income tax receipts 0.0 0.2 0.6 
Change in full-time equivalent labour supply 
(persons ‘000s)c 22 48 95 
 
a A range of simulations were completed with different parameter values, and the ‘lower bounds’ can be 
thought of as ‘lowest responses’ and the high as ‘highest responses’. b Since the lowest (highest) result 
for one variable was not necessarily taken from the same simulation as the lowest (highest) value for 
another variable, the elements within the lower/upper bound columns will not sum to the ‘Net change in 
government fiscal position’. c Results are produced in terms of the change in the number of hours of work; 
these are converted to FTEs for ease of interpretation. d Parameter values used for this model run are 
detailed in appendix C. 
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
 
 
Table 1 shows that the results are sensitive to parameter values. The sensitivity analysis 
involved conducting a set of runs with a range of utility parameter combinations. The high 
(low) values represent the maximum (minimum) values obtained from this set of runs; high 
(low) values reported for different variable are not necessarily from the same simulation. 
Results from the ‘central parameter’ simulation pertain to a single simulation. 
In general, increasing subsidy payments increases demand for childcare, and the supply of 
labour hours. Relatively wealthy households (higher income) who receive reduced 
subsidies tend not to change their behaviour much. Low- and middle- income households 
who receive higher subsidy rates respond by increasing their demand for childcare and 
their supply of labour. There is a net fiscal cost associated with the policy, as income tax 
and transfer payment changes from increased labour supply do not offset the additional 
childcare subsidy expense. 
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It is also worth noting that for some individuals, it can appear that despite an apparent 
reduction in their rate of childcare subsidy their childcare demand and labour supply can 
increase. This is because people shift between income groups, as illustrated using an 
example family (figure 3). A person may initially choose to work 8 hours and be eligible 
for a subsidy rate of 70 per cent (when CCB and CCR entitlements are combined). 
Alternatively, they could work for 32 hours a week. Under the current CCB and CCR 
arrangements, due to the means testing of the CCB subsidy rate, they would only receive 
the 50 per cent CCR subsidy if they worked 32 hours a week (assuming they have not 
reached the CCR cap). When the new scheme is introduced, the ECLS subsidy rate at 
32 hours could be 60 per cent for this person.  
As the proposed arrangements offer many families higher subsidies than are currently 
available, they may be encouraged to work more, despite an apparent reduction in their 
subsidy rate (from 70 to 60 per cent). This highlights that it is not only the point value of 
the subsidy at a particular income that matters to a household, it is also the range of 
possible subsidies available to the household for all the income ranges that they could 
achieve. 
 
Figure 3 Example family: work choices effect subsidies 
 
  
 
  
   
16 TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT  
  
Drivers and mechanisms 
The following mechanisms are at work, conditioning the results.  
1. The ECLS policies are likely to increase the overall supply of labour by primary carers. 
People can — in some instances — increase their labour supply despite a decrease in 
their subsidy rate. This is primarily because: 
(a) Some people increase their hours of work to meet the new, more stringent activity 
test requirements. 
(b) If a subsidy rate increases in a higher income bracket, a person might be induced 
to work more. This can occur when the subsidy under ECLS is larger in the higher 
income bracket than it is under the current CCB/CCR arrangements. This might 
still be a lower rate of subsidy than is received at the lower, initial income level 
(with the original, lower labour supply).  
2. The magnitude of the result for formal childcare demand — in aggregate across all 
individuals in the model — is less clear: it could be larger or smaller than the change in 
labour supply. The change in childcare demand can be larger than the labour supply 
change for three reasons: 
(a) Compositional change in labour supply: some of the policy changes induce a 
decline in labour supply from people who use a small amount of childcare relative 
to the hours of labour that they supply, and an increase in labour supply from 
people who use a large amount of childcare relative to their labour supply. Put 
differently, there is a larger increase in childcare demand from people who value 
childcare relatively highly. This can result in a net increase in childcare demand 
that is proportionately larger than the labour supply change. This is illustrated in 
box 3. 
(b) Substitution away from informal and maternal care: a decrease in the relative cost 
of formal childcare causes a substitution away from informal and maternal care.  
(c) SIH data highlights that some households have levels of childcare demand that 
exceed what would be required to facilitate work. The model does not specify 
which attributes of formal childcare such households find desirable (for example, 
educational or social experience for children), but the functional form allows some 
households to derive different levels of utility from formal care. The calibration 
process, which ensures that the families modelled work and care choices are 
consistent with the behaviour identified in the SIH, ensures families with high care 
use relative to work requirements obtain higher utility from using formal care. 
3. Results for transfer expenses, childcare subsidy expenses, and income tax receipts are 
conditional on assuming no changes in wages and no changes in childcare fees. The net 
change in government fiscal position is highly uncertain. Several factors pull net 
revenue in different directions: 
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(a) More direct factors: The change in the level and rates of childcare assistance has a 
direct impact on fiscal cost through the cost of childcare subsidies to government. 
Some people receive more assistance and some receive less (relative to the base). 
The net impact depends on the compositional change in the labour supply relative 
to the changes in assistance payment. To the extent that demand for childcare 
increases in more heavily assisted (lower income groups) or high childcare 
demand cohorts (higher income groups with high labour participation), the fiscal 
cost directly attributable to the childcare subsidy expense will increase. 
(b) More indirect factors: As stated above, the policy is likely to increase labour 
supply. As labour supply increases, the total cost of transfer payments will be 
reduced (for example means-tested family tax benefits are reduced as earnings 
increase). Further, as people work more, income tax collections increase.  
 
Box 3 Illustrations of compositional change and aggregate results 
The microsimulation model aggregates heterogeneous household level responses to produce 
aggregate results. In a number of cases, this aggregation can produce results that appear 
counter intuitive. In particular, this occurs where there are either (a) changes in the patterns of 
childcare use among workers; or (b) differential responses within a group. 
(a) Changes in patterns of childcare use among workers 
Assume person A is initially supplying 8 labour hours and demanding 4 childcare hours, while 
person B is initially out of the labour force. Further assume that a policy change causes person 
A to drop out of the labour force (and cease demanding childcare), while person B starts 
working. Person B starts supplying 24 labour hours and demanding 24 childcare hours. 
The aggregate change (across person A and B) is an additional 16 hours (24 – 8) of labour 
supply with an additional 20 hours (24 – 4) of childcare demand. In this instance, it appears that 
a large amount of additional childcare is required to induce a relatively small amount of 
additional labour supply. 
(b) Differential responses within a group 
If individuals within a group experience different changes, the aggregate results can exhibit 
counter intuitive combinations of signs. Person C might get a large reduction in their childcare 
subsidy ($1000), but might only reduce their labour supply by a small amount (8 hours). Person 
D might get only a small increase in their subsidy ($200), but might increase their labour supply 
by a larger amount (16 hours). 
The aggregate change (across person C and D) is an aggregate $800 subsidy cut ($1000 – 
$200) and an aggregate 8 hour labour supply increase. While this aggregate result may appear 
counter intuitive, it is based on each family in a group responding in a manner that would be 
expected. 
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Understanding the following interactions in the model can help explain the results: 
1. The activity test has a positive impact on labour supply. The database contains a 
number of people (about 2.5 per cent of households) who initially work fewer hours 
than required under the proposed activity test, use some childcare, and are not 
exempted from the work test for reasons such as pursuing education. These households 
face an incentive to increase their work hours to meet the activity test (or lose their 
childcare subsidy). This incentive exists even for scenarios where the subsidy rate 
(once the activity test is met) is reduced. The labour supply response to increased 
out-of-pocket fees is positive for these households — this effect is driven by the 
activity test, not price responsiveness. The work test causes an increased concentration 
of subsidies accruing to those using childcare for work purposes, and encourages those 
working a few hours to increase their work hours.  
2. Relatively high income groups receive less assistance and their disposable income 
net of out-of-pocket fees is reduced. This is because the CCR subsidy (50 per cent of 
childcare costs, up to $7500) is replaced by the lower subsidy of 30 per cent of deemed 
cost. Many work less as a result, although some substitute towards/using more informal 
care or increasing out of pocket expenditure on formal childcare and maintaining hours 
worked. The utility of this group is reduced. High income households are relatively 
unresponsive to reduced assistance (compared to other income groups), opting to fund 
their relatively fixed use of childcare through increased out-of-pocket spending. 
3. Half of families have childcare fees that exceed the deemed cost. For these families, 
the effective subsidy rate is lower than it appears from the rate schedule (because the 
deemed cost is below the childcare fee they face). Relative to the base, this increases 
the possibility that the effective subsidy rate is lower than in the base. Such households 
typically reduce their childcare demand and labour supply. Note that the 
microsimulation framework in no way represents any supply-side changes that could be 
induced by reduced subsidies (for example, reductions in service quality), so any 
changes in out-of-pocket childcare fees brought about by switching to a deemed cost 
approach are assumed to be borne entirely by households. 
4. The primary beneficiaries of the policy change are low- and middle-income 
households. While the simplified system tends to cut benefits to the upper-income 
groups (and some people affected by the new activity test), payments to the low- and 
middle-income groups tend to increase relative to current arrangements. While these 
households experience a decrease in other transfers as they increase their labour supply, 
the new childcare subsidies more than compensate for this loss for approximately 
12 per cent of households, resulting in a net increase in government payments to that 
group. Some middle- and high- income households who would hit the $7500 CCR cap 
if they worked beyond 2-3 days per week could also be beneficiaries of the policy 
change as the net return from working beyond 2-3 days may be higher under the new 
subsidy arrangements. The new arrangements do not have a $7500 cap. 
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5. For most scenarios, there is a substitution away from non-market childcare 
(parental and informal) in favour of formal childcare. Not all increases in childcare 
demand are driven by increased labour supply. This means that there is not a 
one-to-one correspondence between increases in childcare hours and increases in 
labour supply hours.  
Decomposition of model results 
This section illustrates the intuition behind the micro-level responses seen in the model. 
This is followed by a decomposition of model results from the preferred scenario. The 
section concludes with the utility payoff matrices for an example individual in the base and 
in the preferred scenario 1 to illustrate the mechanisms at work. 
Intuition underlying the micro-level behaviour 
The drivers of results can be explained by grouping households based on their behaviour in 
the current base case (table 2).  
 
Table 2 Share of household groups in the database  
Based on pre policy change behaviour 
 Zero childcare demand Positive childcare demand  
Initial labour supply below new work test Group A (40%) Group B (5%) 
Initial labour supply above new work test Group C (35%) Group D (20%) 
  
 
Group A 
For many in this category, the incentive to work is weaker under the policy change than it 
is under the current arrangements, due to the activity test. The main reason is that group A 
is comprised mainly of low income parents, many of whom are eligible for large subsidies 
(in excess of the 80 per cent under the current arrangements) and do not work or demand 
formal childcare. The more stringent activity test increases the hurdle to receive childcare 
assistance and decreases the likelihood of deciding to work. Considering that increases in 
the rate of assistance are relatively small for this group (having initial subsidies in excess 
of 80 per cent of full childcare fees), the additional incentive is unlikely to be sufficient to 
overcome the activity test. To some extent, revisions of the modelling to include the draft 
report proposed exemptions to the activity test (such as for parents receiving Disability 
Support Pension or Carer Payment) may lessen the apparent hurdle imposed by the new 
activity test. 
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When others in this group do increase their labour supply, it is typically by relatively large 
amounts (to reach the new activity test), and tends to be accompanied by a proportionately 
large increase in demand for formal childcare (larger than the average childcare demand 
per hour of labour supply across all individuals in the initial database).  
Group B 
Individuals in group B tend to respond in one of two ways: they either increase their labour 
supply hours to the new activity test level; or remain at low/zero labour supply and cut 
their childcare demand. Those in the first category are significant contributors to the total 
increase in labour supply. 
Since nearly everyone in group B has access to childcare subsidies in the initial data, the 
activity test makes those who do not change their behaviour unambiguously worse off 
(because they will be working and using the same amount of childcare, but will be paying 
more for that care if they are not eligible for ECLS).  
However, those who receive a higher rate of assistance than before and change their 
behaviour (i.e. allowing other factors besides the activity test to vary) can increase their 
utility. In particular, if subsidy rates have become more favourable for someone who 
previously did not work enough hours to satisfy the new activity test, the improved subsidy 
rates might have induced them to their higher level of activity (i.e. the new activity test is 
not what is changing their behaviour). Individual characteristics (such as education, age 
and current wage) are most important for this group, and this influences the nature of the 
tradeoff between childcare and work for the household. The tradeoff between maintaining 
the pre-policy level of childcare and working (governed by utility parameters) plays a key 
role in determining their decision. 
This is the group most likely to improve the net fiscal position. Either:  
• they increase labour supply while maintaining a relatively stable level of childcare 
demand. In this case transfers decrease, income tax receipts increase and subsidy costs 
remain relatively stable, or 
• they maintain a low level of labour supply and reduce their demand for childcare 
services (since they are no longer eligible for the subsidy). In this case, transfers and 
income tax collections remain relatively unchanged and the subsidy cost is reduced.  
The activity test is a significant contributor to the improvement in the fiscal balance (this is 
illustrated quantitatively below). In scenarios where the fiscal position improves, it is 
because the fiscal savings from the activity test combined with savings from reduced 
payments to high income earners more than offset any increases in childcare subsidies to 
other groups. 
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Groups C and D 
Groups C and D are the most responsive to changes in the rate of assistance and are largely 
unaffected by the activity test. For those households who experience cuts in their rate of 
assistance, they typically: 
1. do not change their choices but experience lower utility (due to lower income net of 
taxes and out-of-pocket fees), or 
2. substitute towards (and use more) informal care, or 
3. reduce their hours of labour supply to be at or slightly above the activity test. 
Households that experience an increase in the rate of assistance tend to be highly 
responsive in terms of increasing their labour supply. In general, these households already 
supply labour under the current arrangements. Decreasing out-of-pocket fees increases net 
returns to labour, which (other things equal) will increase the supply of labour.  
Many in group D are already at the CCR cap under the current arrangements. For some of 
these people, the new arrangements increase the rate of assistance they receive, which 
increases childcare subsidy expenses. 
Illustrative decomposition of model results 
This section uses the groups and intuition in the previous section to explain the illustrative 
example for the preferred scenario described in the childcare inquiry draft report and 
detailed in section 3 above. Given the parameter and data limitations discussed above and 
the stage of the model development, these results should be considered preliminary. 
In order to illustrate the impact of the activity test separately from the changes in the 
subsidy rates (as discussed above), it is useful to first decompose the aggregate model 
results. This is illustrated in table 3, where results are disaggregated based on the four 
groups of households discussed above. 
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Table 3 Contribution to illustrative results by each group 
 Group A Group B Group C Group D Total 
Initial childcare demand Zero Non-zero Zero Non-zero  
Initial labour supply relative to new 
activity test 
Below Below Above Above  
Mean annual income net of taxes and 
out of pocket fees ($) 
61 366 59 468 99 083 104 833  
Mean weekly hours worked (hours) 0.5 0.9 30.9 33.2  
Labour supply (millions of hours/week) 0.6 0.1 31.9 20.5  
Childcare demand (millions of 
hours/week) 
0.0 2.6 0.0 16.0  
Millions of hours per week 
     
Demand and supply shifts (hours)      
Labour supply  1.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.9 
Childcare demand  2.0 -0.0 1.5 0.3 3.8 
Billions of dollars per year (2013-14) 
     
Contributions to fiscal position
a
      
Childcare subsidy expense  0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.6 1.3 
Transfer expenses -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 
Income tax receipts 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Change in fiscal position
b
 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 
Change in full-time equivalent labour 
supply (persons ‘000s) 32 8 6 2 48 
 
a Conditional on assumption of no change in wages or in childcare fees. b May not add up due to 
rounding. 
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
 
 
Table 3 shows that the majority of the labour supply increase comes from people who 
initially supply low levels of work and do not demand childcare (group A), and that the 
majority of the fiscal savings comes from people who are affected by the new activity test 
(group B, with a net fiscal position improvement of $0.2 billion per year). 
People with no initial demand for childcare are the major beneficiaries of the subsidy rate 
increases and changes to the activity test (groups A and C). This is reflected in their large 
increase in childcare demand (2.0 and 1.5 million hours per week respectively). While 
there are reductions in other transfer payments ($0.2  billion per year for group A) and 
increased income taxes collected ($0.1 billion per year each), transfers to both groups 
increase (by $0.2 billion per year each). 
Group B is also a non-trivial source of childcare demand under current arrangements. As 
discussed above, the new activity test makes people in this group either (i) start 
working/work more to exceed the activity test or (ii) reduce their childcare demand. Both 
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choices improve the government’s fiscal position, by respectively (i) reducing transfer 
payments ($0.1 billion per year) and increasing income tax revenue slightly or (ii) 
decreasing childcare subsidy payments ($0.1 billion per year). 
Group D contribute to increasing fiscal costs ($0.8 billion per year). This is largely driven 
by the more favourable subsidy rates given to low- and middle-income working families 
under the Commission’s preferred scenario. 
Impacts by income groups 
The impact of the policy can be disaggregated based on the income ranges of households 
pre-policy (table 4). 
 
Table 4 Illustrative impacts on labour supply, childcare demand, and 
childcare subsidy cost by household income 
Household income 
range 
Share of 
households 
(%) 
Change in full 
time 
equivalent 
workers 
(‘000s) 
Change in 
labour supply  
(millions of 
hours per 
week) 
Change in 
childcare 
demand  
(millions of 
hours per 
week) 
Change in 
total childcare 
subsidya 
($m per week) 
Under 40 000 16.5 2.5 0.1 0.0 -2.8b 
40 000 to 60 000 19.0 9.6 0.4 0.5 5.7 
60 000 to 80 000 17.6 17.2 0.7 1.2 5.6 
80 000 to 100 000 18.2 14.0 0.6 1.2 6.4 
100 000 to 130 000 15.2 3.6 0.1 0.9 11.0 
130 000 to 160 000 6.5 1.3 0.1 0.2 2.2 
160 000 to 200 000 4.3 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.6 
200 000 to 300 000 2.1 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -1.3 
Above 300 000 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.4 
 
a Conditional on assuming no changes in wages and no changes in childcare fees. b Note that it is 
possible for there to be large changes in subsidies but small changes in the quantity demanded due to 
compositional shifts within the group (see box 3). 
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
 
 
Table 4 illustrates impacts in three broad categories: 
1. Households with incomes above $160 000 do not, in aggregate, materially change their 
labour supply in response to the policy change. However, they contribute fiscal savings 
from reduced childcare subsidies ($2.3 million per week).12 
                                                 
12 The labour supply increase in the top two income brackets are driven by two factors: 1) a small number of 
observations in that cohort; 2) compositional change, as some within the group receive more favourable 
subsidies and increase labour supply (typically households hitting the $7500 CCR limit under current 
arrangements who receive a subsidy rate of at least 30 per cent of deemed cost under the new 
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2. The lowest income households (under $40 000) increase their labour supply slightly 
(0.1 million hours per week) and cause a government childcare expenditure saving of 
($2.8 million per week). This effect is driven largely by the new activity test, which 
causes some people to cut their demand for formal childcare. 13 
3. Other households produce an aggregate increase in labour supply (summing to 
1.9 million hours per week) and a large increase in formal childcare demand (summing 
to 3.9 million hours per week). This group is the major source of increased fiscal 
expenditure (having an additional childcare subsidy cost of $30.9 million per week). 
An illustration of the decision making process in the model based on an example 
household 
While it is not possible to investigate the responses by all families, it is instructive to 
analyse how incentives change for an example observation. Table 5 shows some 
characteristics for a single-parent household from group D, both pre- and post-policy 
change. This family is assumed to face relatively low fees (below the deemed cost), and in 
this instance would receive an effective subsidy of 100 per cent under the new 
arrangements. Note that this family is just an example, and not representative of all 
responses in the model. The purpose of microsimulation is to represent population 
heterogeneity, as such, no one agent is representative of the behaviour of any other agent in 
the data. 
 
Table 5 Illustrative results for an example household 
 Hours of labour 
supply per 
week 
Childcare hours 
demanded per 
week 
Subsidy  
rate as a 
proportion of 
unit childcare 
cost 
Gross labour 
income per 
week 
Income net of 
tax and transfers 
per week 
Pre-policy 32 20 88.0% $692 $826 
Post-policy 48 40 100.0%a $1 039 $1 026 
 
a. This family is paying a total cost (pre-subsidy) that is below the deemed cost. When fees are below 
deemed cost, the subsidy is the minimum of the actual fees paid or the families eligible proportion of the 
deemed cost. This is why their rate (100%) is larger than the upper bound on rates (90%) shown in 
figure 1. 
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
arrangements), while others within the group receive lower rates of assistance, but do not reduce work 
(instead funding formal childcare out-of-pocket). 
13 However, this group is likely to contain a disproportionate share of families that would be exempt from 
the proposed activity test (such as children deemed to be at risk, those where grandparents are the primary 
carers for the children, parents in receipt of a Disability Support Pension or Carer Payment). The SIH did 
not contain sufficient information to identify those families and model these exemptions from the activity 
test. As such, there is likely to be an overstatement of the modelled reduction in childcare use for this 
income group and an understatement of the effect on subsidy expense. 
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Increasing the subsidy decreases out of pocket fees. For a given level of labour supply, the 
household’s utility level has increased (due to the larger amount of income net of taxes and 
out of pocket fees). Reduced out-of-pocket fees also reduce the costs of working and 
increases labour supply, along with the demand for childcare services.  
The utility the household derives from all possible work/childcare decisions pre- and 
post-policy change are shown in tables 6 and 7. The shaded cells indicate the 
utility-maximising choice. Note that units of utility are ordinal — they determine the 
ranking of choices for the individual, but not the relativities. For example, a utility of 12 is 
not necessarily twice as desirable as a utility of 6. 
 
Table 6 Illustrative pre policy utility payoff table 
 Hours of formal childcare 
Hours of 
labour supply 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
0 9.47 7.95 7.71 6.99 6.70 3.73 
8 6.51 6.14 6.44 4.54 5.41 4.04 
16 5.91 6.39 9.13 6.09 6.48 5.09 
24 7.01 6.93 9.04 8.34 10.89 7.02 
32 6.78 8.23 12.40 7.91 6.51 6.94 
40 6.66 7.78 7.53 8.37 9.38 7.21 
48 6.15 7.79 7.17 6.63 12.10 8.68 
56 5.20 7.12 6.04 8.70 6.61 9.70 
 
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
 
 
 
Table 7 Illustrative post-policy utility payoff table 
 Hours of formal childcare 
Hours of 
labour supply 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
0 9.47 7.20 6.21 5.14 4.82 1.81 
8 6.51 5.28 4.71 2.13 2.46 0.52 
16 5.91 6.50 9.35 6.42 6.92 5.63 
24 7.01 7.03 9.24 8.64 11.30 7.53 
32 6.78 8.32 12.58 8.19 6.88 7.41 
40 6.66 7.90 7.77 8.71 9.85 7.79 
48 6.15 7.91 7.41 7.00 12.59 9.30 
56 5.20 7.24 6.30 9.08 7.12 10.34 
 
a Light grey cells indicate where the utility has declined relative to the pre-policy value. The dark grey cells 
indicate values where utility has increased relative to the pre-policy value. The bold number is the 
maximum utility, showing the optimal work-childcare choice. 
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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The individual is made better off by the policy even assuming no behavioural change (at 
32 hours of labour supply, 20 hours of childcare demand). However, a marginally higher 
level of utility can be obtained through a higher labour supply level of 48 hours, with 40 
hours of childcare demand.  
5 Further model developments 
The model as it stands:  
1. is an expansion of the Doiron and Kalb (2005) and Gong and Breunig (2012) 
frameworks. Like these models, it includes the main childcare subsidies and transfers in 
the current system and accurately reproduces the work and care decisions from the 
survey data (for the draft report, modelled decisions are consistent with reported work 
and care decisions in the SIH) 
2. has been used to examine four policy scenarios, which feature adjustments to both the 
activity test and subsidy rates households face, and uses a deemed cost as the basis for 
calculating the subsidy. 
Despite the limitations of the microsimulation framework, the model provides meaningful 
insights into mechanisms driving behavioural change at the individual household level and 
in aggregate. 
The results at the inquiry draft report stage are preliminary and illustrative. The main 
further developments intended to be included in the modelling for the inquiry final report 
include:  
• Estimating parameters for the utility function based on the refined data. 
• Modifications to the database to more closely reflect information contained in 
administrative data to improve estimates of economywide and fiscal impacts.   
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Appendix A — Data 
The Commission’s microsimulation model uses data from two sources: 
• The basic confidential unit record file (CURF) version of the 2011-12 Survey of 
Income and Housing (SIH) (ABS 2013). This survey captures key demographic and 
economic characteristics of individuals residing in private dwellings across Australia. 
• An unpublished administrative childcare dataset (Department of Education, 2013, 
unpublished). This dataset provides a comprehensive description of childcare use, 
childcare prices14, location of services and childcare benefits received. 
After considering multiple sources, the basic SIH was adopted as a starting point, since it 
contained all the variables necessary for a preliminary analysis. There are, however, 
limitations with the basic SIH and the Commission is considering the use of other sources 
for the final report if appropriate. 
Processing the source data 
The model’s database includes two samples extracted from the basic SIH — a 684 
household sample representing lone parents and a 2271 household sample representing 
coupled parents. When extracting samples, a parent was defined as an adult member of a 
household who — for the relevant variable — identified as a parent or guardian of a child 
under 12 years.15 
Variables describing parent’s characteristics were extracted from the basic SIH and 
assigned to the relevant household. Specifically, variables capturing income sources, 
employment status, number of children, age, occupation, industry of employment, location, 
educational attainment and hours of childcare use were extracted.  
Each household was allocated a childcare price based on a random draw from a childcare 
price distribution estimated from the administrative data. This distribution dictates the 
possible childcare prices a household faces, conditional on the location of the household 
(capital city or other location in each state/territory), age of the child in care and the type of 
childcare used. There is a plan for the final report to create a better mapping between 
individuals in the survey data and the childcare prices they face.  
The Commission has identified several limitations with using the basic SIH in the context 
of this modelling project. Specifically: 
• some households are rejected due to inconsistent responses 
                                                 
14 Childcare price was derived by dividing total fees by the number of hours charged for childcare. 
15 For a couple with dependent children, it was sufficient for either member of the couple to identify as a 
parent or guardian of a child under 12 years.  
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• the lack of a detailed location variable means the geographic variation of childcare 
price in the administrative data cannot be fully utilised 
• there are inconsistencies between the basic SIH and the administrative data regarding 
the proportion of households failing the new activity test in the proposed childcare 
policies. 
These concerns do not necessarily invalidate the model’s database. The Commission will, 
however, seek to address these shortcomings for the final report. 
Inconsistent responses 
In the basic SIH, several households report inconsistent combinations ‘total current weekly 
employee income’ and ‘number of hours usually worked per week in main and second 
jobs’. Specifically, some individuals report no labour income and positive employment, or 
positive labour income and no employment. If any person in the household reported 
inconsistent combinations, the household was removed.16 Additionally, any household 
with no children was removed. In total, 521 households were removed from the model’s 
database prior to calibration (table A.1).  
 
Table A.1 From SIH sample to model database 
Aggregate characteristics of observations removed from the model’s database 
Sample Sample 
households 
Population 
unitsa (‘000) 
Labour supply 
(‘000 hours) 
Childcare useb 
(‘000 hours) 
Initial sample 3 476 2 095 104 796 10 545 
Positive income and zero 
hours 
55 32 974 150 
Positive hours and zero 
income 
460 280 17 278 1 363 
Zero children 6 5 297 0 
Final sample prior to 
calibration 
2 955 1 778 86 248 9 032 
 
a Population units reflect the sum of population weights assigned to households in each 
sample. b Childcare use of the youngest child. 
Sources: 2011-12 Survey of Income and Housing (ABS 2013); Productivity Commission estimates. 
 
 
Further, approximately 10 per cent of observations are dropped as part of the endogenous 
model calibration process. The process of model calibration and dropped observations is 
further discussed in appendix B. 
                                                 
16 For some households, the primary earner reported working no hours but earning wage income. As these 
households were dropped, any work reported by the primary carer would be excluded. 
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Childcare prices 
Childcare prices were assigned to households based on the geographic location of childcare 
users and services, the age of the child in care and the type of childcare provided.  
The accuracy of assigned childcare prices is limited by the degree of geographic 
disaggregation in the basic SIH. All households using a particular type of childcare in a 
state17 face prices governed by one of only two distributions reflecting prices within and 
outside capital cities. As a result, the model’s database does not incorporate all childcare 
price variation from the highly geographically disaggregated administrative data. 
Activity test  
The proposed childcare policies adopted in the Commission’s modelling incorporate a new 
activity test to replace the existing activity test. The proportion of households failing the 
new activity test is significantly higher in the basic SIH than in the administrative dataset. 
While this was accounted for in the draft report by reweighting the model’s database to 
better reflect existing users of childcare, this discrepancy may indicate the presence of a 
bias in the SIH. For the final report, there will be further attempts to understand the drivers 
of the differences between the two datasets. 
 
Figure A.1 Impact of the new activity test  
Per cent of current childcare expense paid to families that would fail the new 
activity test by annual income range 
 
 
Data sources: 2011-12 Survey of Income and Housing (ABS 2013); unpublished administrative data 
(Department of Education 2013, unpublished); Commission estimates. 
 
 
                                                 
17  The Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory were considered as a single region in 
accordance with the geographic disaggregation in the basic SIH. 
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Alternative data sources 
The Commission is considering alternative data sources to address the limitations of the 
model’s database. Four alternatives to the basic SIH are: 
1. the expanded CURF version of the 2011-12 Survey of Income and Housing (the 
expanded SIH)  
2. the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey  
3. the childcare administrative data 
4. alternative ABS sources. 
Expanded CURF Survey of Income and Housing 
Adopting the expanded CURF SIH would represent an improvement in variable quality 
and data accuracy.  
The expanded SIH would provide improved location data — facilitating more accurate 
childcare price estimates — and may reduce the need to reject observations for 
inconsistency by providing improved measures of labour income and labour supply. That 
said, the expanded SIH is unlikely to address concerns regarding the possible bias 
identified in the data. 
HILDA 
The HILDA Survey is a longitudinal dataset describing the economic, social, labour 
market and family characteristics of Australian households. The survey has 12 waves, with 
a most recent sample size of 17 472 individuals (HILDA 2013). HILDA provides the basis 
for the Breunig, Gong and King 2010 and the Breunig and Gong 2011 studies.  
The use of HILDA could address concerns with the model’s database. For instance, 
improved data on the geographic location of respondents available in the ‘in-confidence’ 
survey would allow the allocation of more accurate childcare prices (as would the 
expanded CURF SIH).  
There are, however, possible drawbacks associated with HILDA. For instance, concerns 
exist regarding the accuracy of childcare responses (Summerfield et al 2014). Furthermore, 
adopting HILDA is likely to reduce the number of observations in the model’s database. 
The Breunig and Gong (2011) study uses a pooled sample across multiple waves of 
HILDA to produce observations representing 978 partnered females.  
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Administrative data 
The unpublished administrative childcare database provides a comprehensive overview of 
childcare in Australia. Adopting the administrative data as the sole data source could 
present significant advantages — using administrative data alone would eliminate the need 
to assign childcare prices and would provide a comprehensive database of childcare use.  
The administrative data does not, however, contain sufficient demographic variables to 
form the sole data source for the Commission’s model. For instance, the administrative 
data does not report parent’s hours of labour supply, age, industry employment, occupation 
or educational attainment. In addition, the information on incomes is not complete and 
there are doubts over the accuracy of income data that is present. 
Other ABS sources 
Various ABS datasets could be used as alternative sources or for diagnostic purposes. For 
instance, the 2011 Childhood Education and Care Survey reports comprehensive 
demographic and economic data on families of children up to the age of 12 — with 
detailed information only available for a maximum of two (randomly chosen) children per 
family (Australian Bureau of Statistics, sub. 360, p. 2). Furthermore, sources such as the 
2011 Census or the 2011 Labour Force dataset could be used as a benchmark to provide 
insights into the possible sample bias issue (Australian Bureau of Statistics, sub. 360).  
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Appendix B — Model specification 
The PCMC model is comprised of three modules: 
• tax and transfer module 
• childcare module  
• decision module. 
This appendix presents additional detail on the decision module. 
Decision module framework 
In the PCMC model, primary care givers have 168 hours in a week to spend on various 
activities. It is assumed that 56 of these hours are spent sleeping. Of the remaining 112 
hours, primary care givers can choose to work, look after their child(ren), or enjoy leisure, 
home production or other activities.  
Children are also assumed to have 168 hours in the week. They are assumed to sleep for 70 
of those hours, and their remaining hours can be spent being minded by the primary care 
giver, being minded in formal childcare, being minded at school (for school-aged children) 
or being minded in informal care.  
A number of simplifying assumptions are made regarding when these activities can occur. 
If a child is at home and the primary caregiver is at home (and they are both awake), the 
primary care giver is assumed to care for the child.  
• If the child is in formal care (or at school) and the primary care giver is at home, the 
primary care giver is assumed to undertake leisure/home production.  
• If the primary care giver is at work, and the child is not in formal care, the child is 
assumed to be in informal care (this includes care by the secondary care giver in a 
couple). 
Households are assumed to make two choices simultaneously: 
• the number of hours that the primary care giver works  
• the number of hours that the youngest child is in formal child care. 
Households must choose from a set of discrete options for these two choices.  
• Labour supply can be 0, 8, 16, 24, 32, 40, 48 or 56 hours a week 
• Formal child care can be 0, 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 hours a week.18 
                                                 
18 Outside of school hours care can be 0,4,8,12,16 or 20 hours. This is equal to two fifths of the formal child 
care choices. 
   
 MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF CHILDCARE POLICY CHANGESMODELLING THE EFFECTS OF 
CHILDCARE POLICY CHANGES - TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT TO DRAFT REPORT - CHILDCARE AND 
EARLY CHILDHOOD LEARNING 
33 
  
Households with multiple children are assumed to base labour supply and childcare 
decisions on the caring needs of the youngest child. That is, childcare for older children 
mirrors the decision for the youngest child. For example, for a family with one pre-school 
and one school-age child, if the younger child requires 40 hours per week of 
non-primary-carer childcare, the older child would also require 40 hours of care 
(comprising of school and outside of school hours care). The costs associated with the 
formal care of all children in a household factor in the estimate of a household’s net 
income and its decisions (that is, households have to pay for and receive utility from care 
for all children, but the nature of the care decision is driven by the youngest).  
Households are permitted to use one type of formal care for children aged 0 to 4 years old. 
The types of care available for 0 to 4 year olds are: long day care, family day care, nannies 
and up to 15 hours per week of preschool. Households who do not use a type of care in the 
base case, are assigned a childcare type for children aged 0 to 4, based on their income and 
childcare administrative data to inform the underlying probability distribution. All children 
aged 5-12 are assumed to use outside of school hours care if any formal care is required, 
and receive the same amount of informal care as younger children. 
Households are assigned a childcare price per hour for their care types based on their 
location. This price is drawn from a probability distributions based on the administrative 
data. 
The utility function 
Households are assumed to choose the combination of the number of hours of work 
supplied by the primary care giver and the number of hours of formal childcare demanded 
that maximises household utility. 
Primary carers can make a choice from the limited set of discrete combinations of labour 
and childcare hours mentioned above.  
Households derive utility (u) (or disutility) from: 
• household income net of taxes and transfers less out-of-pocket childcare costs (y) 
• the labour supply of adult members of the household (h)19 
• childcare provided by the primary care giver (m) 
• formal child care (f) — the utility derived from formal childcare increases as the labour 
supply of the primary care giver increases. 
Like MITTS, the model uses a quadratic utility function. This function consists of squared 
terms, linear terms for all inputs and cross product terms for all inputs into the utility 
function. 
                                                 
19 Note that labour supply is also driving the level of income 
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A fixed cost of working parameter is included in the income variable (𝛾). This is used to 
prevent the model from under-predicting non-participation and over-predicting part-time 
hours. 
Heterogeneity of preferences was included in the module by making the linear terms 
(including the fixed cost term) depend on household and individual characteristics (such as 
the age of the youngest child, the number of children, age of parents and educational 
attainment of parents). 
The deterministic component of the utility function for sole parent households can be 
represented as:20 
(1) 𝑢 = 𝛼𝑦(𝑦 − 𝛾)2 + 𝛼ℎ(ℎ)2 + 𝛼𝑓(𝑓)2 + 𝛼𝑦ℎ(𝑦 − 𝛾)ℎ + 𝛼𝑦𝑚(𝑦 − 𝛾)𝑚+ 𝛼ℎ𝑓ℎ𝑓 
    +𝛽𝑦(𝑦 − 𝛾) + 𝛽ℎℎ + 𝛽𝑚𝑚 
where the ‘α’s and the ‘β’s are parameter values. The utility function for couple households 
can be represented as: 
(2) 𝑢 = 𝛼𝑦(𝑦 − 𝛾)2 + 𝛼ℎ2(ℎ2)2 + 𝛼𝑓(𝑓)2 + 𝛼𝑦ℎ1(𝑦 − 𝛾)ℎ1 
 +𝛼𝑦ℎ2(𝑦 − 𝛾)ℎ2 + 𝛼𝑦𝑚(𝑦 − 𝛾)𝑚 + 𝛼ℎ1𝑚ℎ1𝑚 + 𝛼ℎ2𝑓ℎ2𝑓 + 𝛽𝑦(𝑦 − 𝛾) 
 +𝛽ℎ1ℎ1 + 𝛽ℎ2ℎ2 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚21 
                                                 
20 Note that the utility function is missing several interaction terms. The reason for this is that parameters 
were taken and adjusted from –past studies, which did not include these terms. A utility specification 
containing all material interaction terms will be used for the final report. 
21 Note that the utility function for couples includes some partner variables that will have no effect on model 
results. 
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Individual household responses are complex 
The model used by the Commission for the draft report contains the utility specification 
detailed above. While individual level responses — and consequently aggregate 
responses — could be derived, the relationships would be very complicated. For this 
reason, the simulation approach documented in this paper does not directly derive 
individual response functions. 
Households choose their level of labour supply, the level of childcare provided by the 
primary carer, and formal childcare demand to maximise utility. Equation (2) could be 
expressed in functional form notation as: 
(3) 𝑢 = 𝑈(𝑦,ℎ,𝑚,𝑓) 
Where U(.) is the function converting the inputs into household utility. Note that equation 
(3) does not contain an informal care or leisure term, as these are implied from the other 
terms. Informal care is defined as a residual, such that informal childcare equals the 
minimum of either (a) formal care less primary-carer labour supply or (b) zero.22  
This utility function can be re-expressed as a function of only h and f by substituting other 
functions into (3)23: 
• Reflecting constraints on the total available hours of the primary carer, and the total 
required time of care for children, the amount of care provided by the primary carer (m) 
can be thought of as a function C(.) of household labour supply (h) and formal 
childcare demand (f).  
• Similarly, assuming a fixed price of childcare and a fixed wage for each household, 
household income net of taxes and transfers less childcare costs can be thought of as a 
function T(.) of the tax and transfer system, household labour supply (h) and formal 
childcare demand (f) 
These substitutions allow the household utility function to be simplified to: 
(4) 𝑢 = 𝑈�𝑇(ℎ,𝑓),ℎ,𝑓,𝐶(ℎ,𝑓)� = 𝑉(ℎ,𝑓) 
where V(.) is defined for a given wage, childcare price, total hours for the primary carer, 
total required care for the children, and a given tax and transfer system. 
                                                 
22 Informal childcare can be treated as a residual because it is assumed that any formal childcare used by a 
household will be used while the primary carer is working, unless the formal childcare hours are greater 
than hours of labour supply. This is consistent with the approach adopted by Gong and Breunig (2012). 
23 Note that the model used by the Commission does not substitute out these terms. This substitution is 
made for illustrative purposes in this section only. 
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Assuming differentiability, taking the total differential of (4) with respect to h and setting it 
equal to zero: 
(5) 𝑑𝑢
𝑑ℎ
= 𝜕𝑉(ℎ,𝑓)
𝜕ℎ
+ 𝜕𝑉(ℎ,𝑓)
𝜕𝑓
. 𝑑𝑓
𝑑ℎ
= 0 
Solving equation (5) for h will give the household supply of labour, for given parameters, 
policy environment and formal childcare demand. A similar relationship can be derived for 
formal childcare demand as a function of given parameters, policy environment and labour 
supply, taking the total differential of (4) with respect to f: 
(6) 𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑓
= 𝜕𝑉(ℎ,𝑓)
𝜕𝑓
+ 𝜕𝑉(ℎ,𝑓)
𝜕ℎ
. 𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑓
= 0 
These two relationships could be used to derive an individual household’s childcare 
demand and labour supply as a function of parameters (utility coefficients, wages, 
childcare prices) and the policy environment (tax, transfer and childcare subsidy system). 
In order to describe the household’s response to a policy change, the difference would need 
to be taken between the functions derived from (5) and (6), and alternative functions 
derived with a new tax, transfer and childcare cost function (replacing T(.) in equation (4)).  
An aggregate function would require a weighted sum of all of these individual household 
change functions. This relationship would be very complex (containing many terms). The 
complicated nature of the resulting functions (and difficulty deriving them) make 
simulation methods (like those used in this paper) a practical method for evaluating the 
impacts of policy change. 
Parameter values 
Ideally, the parameters of the household utility functions (the ‘α’s and the ‘β’s) would be 
estimated econometrically. However, the Commission has not had sufficient time to 
estimate the model parameters for the draft report. Rather, the Commission has used a set 
of values that are informed by parameters in Doiron and Kalb (2005) and Gong and 
Breunig (2013).  
This approach has a number of drawbacks. For example, the reported parameters from 
previous research are based on older datasets. Furthermore, neither of these studies employ 
the exact same utility function that is used in the Commission’s model. For this reason, the 
modelling included in the draft report is preliminary. 
The Commission intends to estimate the utility function parameters for the modelling that 
is included in the final report. 
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Calibration 
The decision making module needs to be calibrated to replicate observed data for 
households before the effects of policy changes can be estimated.  
In practice, a parameterised utility function (even with parameters varying by demographic 
characteristics) will not perfectly reproduce observed data for all individuals in the dataset. 
In order to ensure the initial database can be reproduced using the model, a process of 
calibration is completed. 
Calibration involves generating a set of error terms (one for each combination of labour 
supply and childcare demand, and drawn from a standard Gumbel distribution), adding 
them to the utility function, and testing whether the households replicate their observed 
behaviour. If they do, that set of errors is stored. If they do not, that set of errors is 
discarded.  
This process is replicated until each household has 10 sets of errors that lead to the utility 
function reproducing observed behaviour. Households are dropped from the dataset if they 
are too difficult to calibrate (it takes more than 500 attempts to obtain a plausible set of 
errors). 
This process is documented in Creedy and Kalb (2005). 
These error terms (described as ‘unobserved utility’ or ‘calibration’ parameters) can be 
thought of as including individual-specific factors outside the model that cause a household 
to a have the particular work-care choice observed in the data. 
The wage equation  
There is no wage reported in the database for individuals who do not work (and thus do not 
earn a salary). However, to model the impact of changes in childcare prices, wages are 
required for all individuals.  
Ideally, estimates of unobserved wages would be obtained by estimating a wage equation. 
Instead, for the draft report, the Commission has used a wage equation that is based on the 
wage equation estimated by Kalb (2004). 
The Commission intends to estimate a wage equation for the final report. This wage 
equation will be estimated simultaneously with the utility function. 
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Appendix C — Model parameters 
In the current version of the model, the utility and wage parameters have not been 
estimated using the above data sets. Instead, the parameters used in the model are based on 
those from the Doiron and Kalb (2005) model, adjusted to reflect differences in the utility 
function for the current model. Parameters will be estimated for the final report using the 
Commission’s dataset. 
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Table C.1 Utility function parameter values — single parents 
 Youngest child aged 0 4 Youngest child at primary school 
Income squared × 100 000 -0.3000 -0.3000 
Labour supply squared × 100 -0.0199 -0.0199 
Formal childcare squared × 100 -0.4000 -0.4500 
Labour supply × income × 10 000 -1.0000 -1.5000 
Income × primary care giver childcare × 
10 000 b 
-0.5010 -0.5010 
Labour supply × formal childcare × 100 1.5000 1.0000 
Income × 100   
Constant 2.3000 1.5000 
Youngest child aged 0-2 0.4762 — 
Youngest child aged 3-4 -0.1161 — 
Youngest child aged 5-9 — 0.8649 
Number of dependent children 0.1135 0.1135 
Age × 10 -0.2572 -0.2572 
Age squared × 100 0.0127 0.0127 
Highest qualification: vocational 
education -0.0452 -0.0452 
Highest qualification: diploma or degree -0.0165 -0.0165 
Female 0.0300 0.0300 
Labour supply    
Constant -0.2700 -0.1473 
Youngest child aged 0-2 -0.0355 — 
Youngest child aged 3-4 -0.0214 — 
Youngest child aged 5-9 -0.0534 0.0080 
Number of dependent children -0.0020 -0.0020 
Age × 10 0.0909 0.0909 
Age squared × 100 -0.0111 -0.0111 
Highest qualification: vocational 
education 0.0169 0.0169 
Highest qualification: diploma or degree 0.0242 0.0242 
Female -0.0486 -0.0486 
Fixed cost parameter ÷ 100   
Constant 2.3593 2.3593 
Resides in capital city 0.0563 0.0563 
Youngest child aged 0-4 -0.2301 — 
Youngest child aged 5-9 — -0.6367 
Resides in NSW 0.2290 0.2290 
Female -0.4902 -1.3900 
Primary carer childcare   
Constant 0.0200 0.1000 
Age × 10 0.0500 0.0500 
Age squared × 100 -0.0050 -0.0050 
Female 0.0310 0.0310 
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Table C.2 Utility function parameter values — couple parents 
 Youngest 
child 0 4 
Youngest child at 
primary school 
Income squared × 100 000 -0.0021 -0.0021 
Labour supply (primary carer) squared × 100 -0.1912 -0.1912 
Formal childcare squared × 100 -0.8000 -0.8000 
Labour supply (primary earner) × income × 10 000 -0.0500 -0.0500 
Labour supply (primary carer) × income × 10 000 -0.0250 -0.0250 
Labour supply (primary earner) × Labour supply (primary carer) × 100  -0.0466 -0.0466 
Labour supply (primary earner) × primary carer childcare × 100 0.0050 0.0050 
Labour supply (primary carer) × formal childcare × 10 000 1.0000 1.0000 
Income × primary carer childcare ×10 000 -0.5000 -0.5000 
Income × 100   
Constant 0.5000 0.5000 
Number of children -0.0095 -0.0095 
Labour Supply (primary earner)   
Constant 0.3622 0.3622 
Youngest child aged 0-2 0.0001 0.0001 
Youngest child aged 3-4 -0.0025 -0.0025 
Youngest child aged 5-9 0.0004 0.0004 
Number of children 0.0009 0.0009 
Age × 10 0.0633 0.0633 
Age squared × 100 -0.0086 -0.0086 
Highest qualification: vocational education 0.0086 0.0086 
Highest qualification: diploma  0.0065 0.0065 
Highest qualification: degree 0.0114 0.0114 
Highest qualification: vocational education (primary carer) 0.0024 0.0024 
Highest qualification: diploma (primary carer)  0.0005 0.0005 
Highest qualification: degree (primary carer) 0.0023 0.0023 
Labour Supply (primary carer)   
Constant 0.0567 0.0567 
Youngest child aged 0-2 -0.0693 -0.0693 
Youngest child aged 3-4 -0.0498 -0.0498 
Youngest child aged 5-9 -0.0212 -0.0212 
Number of children -0.0057 -0.0057 
Age × 10 0.0452 0.0452 
Age squared × 100 -0.0075 -0.0075 
Highest qualification: vocational education -0.0001 -0.0001 
Highest qualification: diploma  -0.0032 -0.0032 
Highest qualification: degree -0.0070 -0.0070 
Highest qualification: vocational education (primary earner) 0.0090 0.0090 
Highest qualification: diploma (primary earner)  0.0169 0.0169 
Highest qualification: degree (primary earner) 0.0287 0.0287 
Fixed cost parameter (primary earner) ÷ 100 8.0933 8.0933 
Fixed cost parameter (primary carer) ÷ 100 2.0702 2.0702 
Primary carer childcare   
Constant 0.1000 0.1000 
Age (primary carer) × 10 0.0500 0.0500 
Age (primary carer) squared × 100 -0.0050 -0.0050 
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Table C.3 Wage parameters 
 Sole parent Coupled Male Coupled Female 
Constant 2.37 1.87 1.96 
Female -0.15 — — 
Age ×10 -0.11 0.27 0.20 
Age squared x 100 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
Occupation: Professional 0.30 0.20 0.32 
Occupation: Paraprofessional 0.24 0.16 0.23 
Occupation: Clerical/Sales 0.10 0.06 0.11 
Industry: Mining 1.23 0.62 0.26 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.08 0.26 0.11 
Industry: Construction 0.05 0.23 0.26 
Industry: Utilities 0.48 0.34 0.25 
Industry: Trade 0.08 0.12 0.06 
Industry: Transport 0.22 0.29 0.18 
Industry: Communication 0.26 0.30 0.18 
Industry: Financial/business services 0.13 0.24 0.14 
Industry: Other Services 0.10 0.18 0.08 
Highest qualification: Postgraduate 0.34 0.08 0.15 
Highest qualification: Undergraduate 0.20 -0.01 0.10 
Highest qualification: Diploma 0.10 0.14 0.09 
Highest qualification: Vocational -0.01 0.06 0.02 
State of residence: Victoria -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 
State of residence: Queensland -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 
State of residence: South Australia -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 
State of residence: Western Australia -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 
State of residence: Tasmania 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 
State of residence: ACT/Northern Territory 0.09 0.07 0.07 
Capital city 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Mills ratio 0.21 -0.01 0.11 
Age × Highest qualification: degree — 0.06 0.02 
σ 0.36 0.37 0.35 
ρ -0.05 0.00 0.05 
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Appendix D — Model results for all scenarios 
Scenario 1 
 
Figure D.1 Schedule of subsidy rates under the new policy scenarioa — 
scenario 1 (90-30 linear) 
 
 
a The ‘new policy’ replaces existing CCB and CCR arrangements with a single means tested subsidy rate 
applied to a deemed cost base, detailed above.. 
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Table D.1 Illustrative labour supply, childcare demand and fiscal 
results — scenario 1 
 Lower bound 
results from all 
sensitivity 
simulationsa 
Example Upper bound 
results from all 
sensitivity 
simulations 
Millions of hours per week    
Demand and supply shifts    
Labour supply base 53.1 53.1 53.1 
Labour supply policy 54.0 55.0 56.8 
Labour supply change 0.9 1.9 3.8 
Childcare demand base 18.7 18.7 18.7 
Childcare demand policy 20.3 22.4 27.3 
Childcare demand change 1.7 3.8 8.6 
Billions of dollars per year (2013-14)    
Net change in government fiscal positionb -2.7 -0.8 0.8 
Change in childcare subsidy expense  0.2 1.3 3.3 
Change in transfer expense -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 
Change in income tax receipts 0.0 0.2 0.6 
Change in full-time equivalent labour supply 
persons (‘000s) c 22 48 95 
 
a A range of simulations were completed with different parameter values, and the ‘lower bounds’ can be 
thought of as ‘lowest responses’ and the high as ‘highest responses’. b  Since the lowest (highest) result 
for one variable was not necessarily taken from the same simulation as the lowest (highest) value for 
another variable, the elements within the lower/upper bound columns will not sum to the ‘Net change in 
government fiscal position’. c  Results are produced in terms of the change in the number of hours of 
work; these are converted to FTEs for ease of interpretation.  
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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Table D.2 Contribution to illustrative results by each group — 
scenario 1 
subtitle 
 Group A Group B Group C Group D Total 
Initial childcare demand Zero Non-zero Zero Non-zero  
Initial labour supply relative to new activity test Below Below Above Above  
Mean annual income net of taxes and out of 
pocket fees ($) 61 366 59 468 99 083 104 833  
Mean weekly hours worked (hours) 0.5 0.9 33.2 30.9  
Labour supply (millions of hours/week) 0.6 0.1 31.9 20.5  
Childcare demand (millions of hours/week) 0.0 2.6 0.0 16.0  
Millions of hours per week      
Demand and supply shifts (hours)      
Labour supply  1.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.9 
Childcare demand  2.0 -0.0 1.5 0.3 3.8 
Billions of dollars per year (2013-14)     
 
Contributions to fiscal positionb      
Childcare subsidy expense  0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.6 1.3 
Transfer expenses -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 
Income tax receipts 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Change in fiscal positiona -0.3 0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 
Change in full-time equivalent labour supply 
persons (‘000s) 32 8 6 2 48 
 
a May not add up due to rounding. b Conditional on assumption of no change in wages or in childcare 
fees.   
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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Table D.3 Illustrative impacts on labour supply, childcare demand, and 
childcare subsidy cost by household income — scenario 1 
Household income range Share of 
households 
(%) 
Change in 
full-time 
equivalent 
workers 
(‘000s) 
Change in 
labour supply  
(millions of 
hours per 
week) 
Change in 
childcare 
demand  
(millions of 
hours per 
week) 
Change in total 
childcare 
subsidya 
($m per week) 
Under 40 000 16.5 2.5 0.1 0.0 -2.8b 
40 000 to 60 000 19.0 9.6 0.4 0.5 5.7 
60 000 to 80 000 17.6 17.2 0.7 1.2 5.6 
80 000 to 100 000 18.2 14.0 0.6 1.2 6.4 
100 000 to 130 000 15.2 3.6 0.1 0.9 11.0 
130 000 to 160 000 6.5 1.3 0.1 0.2 2.2 
160 000 to 200 000 4.3 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.6 
200 000 to 300 000 2.1 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -1.3 
Above 300 000 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.4 
 
a Conditional on assuming no changes in wages and no changes in childcare fees. b Note that it is 
possible for there to be large changes in subsidies but small changes in the quantity demanded due to 
compositional shifts within the group (see box 3). 
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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Scenario 2 
 
Figure D.2 Schedule of subsidy rates under the new policy scenarioa — 
scenario 2 (90-30 stepped) 
 
 
a The ‘new policy’ replaces existing CCB and CCR arrangements with a single means tested subsidy rate 
applied to a deemed cost base, detailed above. 
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Table D.4 Illustrative labour supply, childcare demand and fiscal 
results — scenario 2 
 Lower bound 
results from all 
sensitivity 
simulationsa 
Example Upper bound 
results from all 
sensitivity 
simulations 
Millions of hours per week    
Demand and supply shifts    
Labour supply base 53.1 53.1 53.1 
Labour supply policy 53.2 53.9 54.5 
Labour supply change 0.1 0.8 1.4 
Childcare demand base 18.7 18.7 18.7 
Childcare demand policy 18.7 19.8 21.1 
Childcare demand change 0.1 1.1 2.4 
Billions of dollars per year (2013-14)    
Net change in government fiscal positionb -0.8 0.4 1.5 
Change in childcare subsidy expense  -0.9 -0.1 0.8 
Change in transfer expense -0.4 -0.2 0.0 
Change in income tax receipts -0.1 0.1 0.2 
Change in full-time equivalent labour supply 
persons (‘000s) c 4 20 36 
 
a A range of simulations were completed with different parameter values, and the ‘lower bounds’ can be 
thought of as ‘lowest responses’ and the high as ‘highest responses’. b  Since the lowest (highest) result 
for one variable was not necessarily taken from the same simulation as the lowest (highest) value for 
another variable, the elements within the lower/upper bound columns will not sum to the ‘Net change in 
government fiscal position’.  c  Results are produced in terms of the change in the number of hours of 
work; these are converted to FTEs for ease of interpretation. 
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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Table D.5 Contribution to illustrative results by each group — 
scenario 2 
 Group A Group B Group C Group D Total 
Initial childcare demand Zero Non-zero Zero Non-zero  
Initial labour supply relative to new activity test Below Below Above Above  
Mean annual income net of taxes and out of 
pocket fees ($) 61 366 59 468 99 083 104 833  
Mean weekly hours worked (hours) 0.5 0.9 33.2 30.9  
Labour supply (millions of hours/week) 0.6 0.1 31.9 20.5  
Childcare demand (millions of hours/week) 0.0 2.6 0.0 16.0  
Millions of hours per week      
Demand and supply shifts (hours)      
Labour supply  0.6 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.8 
Childcare demand  1.0 -0.2 0.5 -0.2 1.1 
Billions of dollars per year (2013-14)     
 
Contributions to fiscal positionb      
Childcare subsidy expense  0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Transfer expenses -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
Income tax receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Change in fiscal positiona -0.2 0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.4 
Change in full-time equivalent labour supply 
persons (‘000s) 16 6 0 -2 20 
 
a May not add up due to rounding. b Conditional on assumption of no change in wages or in childcare 
fees.   
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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Table D.6 Illustrative impacts on labour supply, childcare demand, and 
childcare subsidy cost by household income — scenario 2 
Household income range Share of 
households 
(%) 
Change in 
full-time 
equivalent 
workers 
(‘000s) 
Change in 
labour supply  
(millions of 
hours per 
week) 
Change in 
childcare 
demand  
(millions of 
hours per 
week) 
Change in total 
childcare 
subsidya 
($m per week) 
Under 40 000 16.5 2.5 0.1 0.0 -2.8 
40 000 to 60 000 19.0 7.5 0.3 0.4 4.2 
60 000 to 80 000 17.6 7.2 0.3 0.6 2.0 
80 000 to 100 000 18.2 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
100 000 to 130 000 15.2 0.6 0.0 0.2 -0.4 
130 000 to 160 000 6.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 -1.6 
160 000 to 200 000 4.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -1.5 
200 000 to 300 000 2.1 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -1.3 
Above 300 000 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.4 
 
a Conditional on assuming no changes in wages and no changes in childcare fees. b Note that it is 
possible for there to be large changes in subsidies but small changes in the quantity demanded due to 
compositional shifts within the group (see box 3). 
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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Scenario 3 
 
Figure D.3 Schedule of subsidy rates under the new policy scenarioa — 
scenario 3 (90-0 linear) 
 
 
a The ‘new policy’ replaces existing CCB and CCR arrangements with a single means tested subsidy rate 
applied to a deemed cost base, detailed above. 
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Table D.7 Illustrative labour supply, childcare demand and fiscal 
results — scenario 3 
 Lower bound 
results from all 
sensitivity 
simulationsa 
Example Upper bound 
results from all 
sensitivity 
simulations 
Millions of hours per week    
Demand and supply shifts    
Labour supply base 53.1 53.1 53.1 
Labour supply policy 53.4 54.3 55.5 
Labour supply change 0.3 1.2 2.4 
Childcare demand base 18.7 18.7 18.7 
Childcare demand policy 19.4 20.6 23.6 
Childcare demand change 0.7 1.9 5.0 
Billions of dollars per year (2013-14)    
Net change in government fiscal positionb -1.4 0.1 1.5 
Change in childcare subsidy expense  -0.8 0.2 1.6 
Change in transfer expense -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 
Change in income tax receipts -0.1 0.1 0.3 
Change in full-time equivalent labour supply 
persons (‘000s) c 9 30 60 
 
a A range of simulations were completed with different parameter values, and the ‘lower bounds’ can be 
thought of as ‘lowest responses’ and the high as ‘highest responses’. b  Since the lowest (highest) result 
for one variable was not necessarily taken from the same simulation as the lowest (highest) value for 
another variable, the elements within the lower/upper bound columns will not sum to the ‘Net change in 
government fiscal position’. c  Results are produced in terms of the change in the number of hours of 
work; these are converted to FTEs for ease of interpretation.  
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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Table D.8 Contribution to illustrative results by each group — 
scenario 3 
 Group A Group B Group C Group D Total 
Initial childcare demand Zero Non-zero Zero Non-zero  
Initial labour supply relative to new activity test Below Below Above Above  
Mean annual income net of taxes and out of 
pocket fees ($) 61 366 59 468 99 083 104 833  
Mean weekly hours worked (hours) 0.5 0.9 33.2 30.9  
Labour supply (millions of hours/week) 0.6 0.1 31.9 20.5  
Childcare demand (millions of hours/week) 0.0 2.6 0.0 16.0  
Millions of hours per week      
Demand and supply shifts (hours)      
Labour supply  0.9 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.2 
Childcare demand  1.4 -0.1 0.9 -0.2 1.9 
Billions of dollars per year (2013-14)     
 
Contributions to fiscal positionb      
Childcare subsidy expense  0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Transfer expenses -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 
Income tax receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Change in fiscal positiona -0.6 1.2 -0.9 0.4 0.1 
Change in full-time equivalent labour supply 
persons (‘000s) 22 7 2 -1 30 
 
a May not add up due to rounding. b Conditional on assumption of no change in wages or in childcare 
fees.   
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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Table D.9 Illustrative impacts on labour supply, childcare demand, and 
childcare subsidy cost by household income — scenario 3 
Household income range Share of 
households 
(%) 
Change in 
full-time 
equivalent 
workers 
(‘000s) 
Change in 
labour supply  
(millions of 
hours per 
week) 
Change in 
childcare 
demand  
(millions of 
hours per 
week) 
Change in total 
childcare 
subsidya 
($m per week) 
Under 40 000 16.5 2.5 0.1 0.0 -2.8 
40 000 to 60 000 19.0 8.4 0.3 0.4 4.9 
60 000 to 80 000 17.6 12.5 0.5 0.9 3.9 
80 000 to 100 000 18.2 6.8 0.3 0.6 3.2 
100 000 to 130 000 15.2 -0.3 0.0 0.4 3.8 
130 000 to 160 000 6.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 -2.0 
160 000 to 200 000 4.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -2.9 
200 000 to 300 000 2.1 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -2.9 
Above 300 000 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.8 
 
a Conditional on assuming no changes in wages and no changes in childcare fees. b Note that it is 
possible for there to be large changes in subsidies but small changes in the quantity demanded due to 
compositional shifts within the group (see box 3). 
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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Scenario 4 
 
Figure D.4 Schedule of subsidy rates under the new policy scenarioa — 
scenario 4 (90-0 stepped) 
 
 
a The ‘new policy’ replaces existing CCB and CCR arrangements with a single means tested subsidy rate 
applied to a deemed cost base, detailed above. 
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Table D.10 Illustrative labour supply, childcare demand and fiscal 
results — scenario 4 
 Lower bound 
results from all 
sensitivity 
simulationsa 
Example Upper bound 
results from all 
sensitivity 
simulations 
Millions of hours per week    
Demand and supply shifts    
Labour supply base 53.1 53.1 53.1 
Labour supply policy 53.0 53.8 54.4 
Labour supply change -0.1 0.7 1.3 
Childcare demand base 18.7 18.7 18.7 
Childcare demand policy 18.2 19.3 20.7 
Childcare demand change -0.4 0.6 2.0 
Billions of dollars per year (2013-14)    
Net change in government fiscal positionb -0.5 0.7 2.0 
Change in childcare subsidy expense  -1.4 -0.5 0.5 
Change in transfer expense -0.4 -0.2 0.0 
Change in income tax receipts -0.2 0.0 0.2 
Change in full-time equivalent labour supply 
persons (‘000s) c -1 17 33 
 
a A range of simulations were completed with different parameter values, and the ‘lower bounds’ can be 
thought of as ‘lowest responses’ and the high as ‘highest responses’. b  Since the lowest (highest) result 
for one variable was not necessarily taken from the same simulation as the lowest (highest) value for 
another variable, the elements within the lower/upper bound columns will not sum to the ‘Net change in 
government fiscal position’.  c  Results are produced in terms of the change in the number of hours of 
work; these are converted to FTEs for ease of interpretation.  
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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Table D.11 Contribution to illustrative results by each group — 
scenario 4 
 Group A Group B Group C Group D Total 
Initial childcare demand Zero Non-zero Zero Non-zero  
Initial labour supply relative to new activity test Below Below Above Above  
Mean annual income net of taxes and out of 
pocket fees ($) 61 366 59 468 99 083 104 833  
Mean weekly hours worked (hours) 0.5 0.9 33.2 30.9  
Labour supply (millions of hours/week) 0.6 0.1 31.9 20.5  
Childcare demand (millions of hours/week) 0.0 2.6 0.0 16.0  
Millions of hours per week      
Demand and supply shifts (hours)      
Labour supply  0.6 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.7 
Childcare demand  1.0 -0.2 0.4 -0.6 0.6 
Billions of dollars per year (2013-14)     
 
Contributions to fiscal positionb      
Childcare subsidy expense  0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.7 -0.5 
Transfer expenses -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
Income tax receipts 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
Change in fiscal positiona -0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.6 0.7 
Change in full-time equivalent labour supply 
persons (‘000s) 15 6 0 -4 17 
 
a May not add up due to rounding. b Conditional on assumption of no change in wages or in childcare 
fees.   
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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Table D.12 Illustrative impacts on labour supply, childcare demand, and 
childcare subsidy cost by household income — scenario 4 
Household income range Share of 
households 
(%) 
Change in 
full-time 
equivalent 
workers 
(‘000s) 
Change in 
labour supply  
(millions of 
hours per 
week) 
Change in 
childcare 
demand  
(millions of 
hours per 
week) 
Change in total 
childcare 
subsidya 
($m per week) 
Under 40 000 16.5 2.5 0.1 0.0 -2.8 
40 000 to 60 000 19.0 7.5 0.3 0.4 4.2 
60 000 to 80 000 17.6 7.2 0.3 0.6 2.0 
80 000 to 100 000 18.2 0.9 0.0 0.1 -0.1 
100 000 to 130 000 15.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -2.0 
130 000 to 160 000 6.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -3.9 
160 000 to 200 000 4.3 -0.8 0.0 -0.2 -3.5 
200 000 to 300 000 2.1 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -2.9 
Above 300 000 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.8 
 
a Conditional on assuming no changes in wages and no changes in childcare fees. b Note that it is 
possible for there to be large changes in subsidies but small changes in the quantity demanded due to 
compositional shifts within the group (see box 3). 
Source: PCMC model estimates. 
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